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E-books, Collusion, and Antitrust Policy: Protecting a 
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Nicholas Timchalk* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Technological progress will inevitably drive the law toward a path 
of modernization. Specifically, antitrust law must remain aware of the 
ever-changing economic environment driven by innovation.1 Amazon led 
the charge with one such innovation by transforming the reading experi-
ence into the modern digital age with the e-book. Amazon catalyzed the 
inception of the e-book market by introducing the Kindle to gain wide-
spread commercial acceptance in 2007.2 Amazon became the dominant 
firm in the sale of e-books and e-book readers by controlling about 90% 
of the market.3 As an innovator, Amazon had the luxury of determining 
the retail price for its books as well as the supply arrangement with its 
publishers. Thus, its market positioning as a large online discount retailer 
influenced its decision to use a wholesale model4 and use a discount pric-
ing strategy by charging $9.99 for certain new release and bestselling e-
books.5 With a digital book discount, Amazon’s $9.99 price point rough-
ly matched the wholesale price of many of its e-books.6 
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 1. See PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, 2B ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 407a (3d ed. 2006) 
(arguing that “technological progress contributes significantly more to consumer welfare than does 
the elimination of non-competitive prices”). 
 2. United States v. Apple Inc., 952 F. Supp. 2d 638, 649 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
 3. Id. 
 4. The wholesale model makes sense for Amazon because this is what the physical book mar-
ket has always used. Moreover, the model allows Amazon to control the retail price to consumers, 
which is vital for a large discount retailer. 
 5. Apple Inc., 952 F. Supp. 2d at 649. 
 6. Id. The non-settling defendants and several public comments contend that the $9.99 price 
point was below the wholesale price paid by Amazon. See generally id. Evidence also showed that 
“wholesale prices for e-books typically fell in the range of $13 to $15, and some were even sold at 
prices as high as $17.50.” Id. at 656. 
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Rival firms quickly positioned themselves to enter and compete in 
the e-book market after witnessing Amazon’s substantial success and the 
changing consumer preferences towards the digital consumption of me-
dia.7 Indeed, Apple’s iPad and Barnes & Noble’s Nook were the two po-
tential competitors in the beginning and are still currently Amazon’s 
main competitors.8 
United States v. Apple Inc. arose from the aftermath of firms at-
tempting to pressure Amazon’s initial dominance in the e-book market.9 
In short, book publishers were unhappy with Amazon pricing their new 
releases and bestsellers below the wholesale price Amazon paid.10 Ap-
ple—preparing to launch its iBookstore in conjunction with its iPad—
recognized the publishers’ discontent with Amazon’s prices and offered 
the publishers a different supply arrangement. 11  This arrangement 
(known as an agency arrangement) allowed the publishers to set the retail 
prices and allowed Apple to receive a commission on the books it sold.12 
For this plan to work, each publisher had to commit to the new arrange-
ment to pressure Amazon to abandon its discount pricing strategy.13 In 
the end, Apple launched the iBookstore with the publishers under an 
agency arrangement.14 The publishers attempted to compel Amazon to 
switch to similar agency agreements in order to have more control over 
the retail price for their books.15 Consequently, Amazon complained to 
the Federal Trade Commission about the publishers’ simultaneous de-
mands for it to switch to an agency contract.16 The Department of Justice 
filed a suit against Apple and the publishers for violating Section 1 of the 
Sherman Act, alleging a price-fixing conspiracy between all the defend-
ants.17 After a bench trial in the Southern District of New York, Judge 
Cote found Apple liable for a price-fixing conspiracy with the publisher 
defendants in restraint of trade.18 
                                                 
 7. “Apple strongly hoped to announce its new iBookstore when it launched the iPad, . . . but 
would only do so if it had agreements in place with a core group of [p]ublishers by that date, could 
assure itself it would make a profit in the iBookstore, and could offer e-book titles simultaneously 
with their hardcover releases.” Id. at 647. 
 8. See id. at 648–49. 
 9. See id. at 654–55. 
 10. Id. at 649–50. 
 11. Id. at 659. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. at 652. 
 14. Id. at 679. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. at 681. 
 17. Id. at 645. 
 18. Id. at 709. 
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Although the e-book market has leveled out to a competitive mar-
ketplace with diverse participants due to the increase of market entry,19 a 
period of time existed during the market’s inception when the innova-
tor’s—Amazon’s—market share was highly suggestive of monopoly 
power.20 Antitrust enforcement can better spot red flags and use greater 
discretion if they properly consider the market conditions created by the 
innovator and the resulting market structure post enforcement. This is 
important because now that e-reader prices have generally dropped due 
to market saturation, Amazon will likely not need to go back to the deep 
e-book discounts to promote the Kindle.21 In essence, even after the en-
forcement of Section 1 of the Sherman Act against Apple, e-book prices 
rose, which may or may not have harmed consumers22 when compared to 
the alternative of the status quo before the publishers and Apple collud-
ed. Hence, an understanding of the unique market conditions prior to the 
illegal conduct can help antitrust law adapt to future cases by understand-
ing the incentives and market forces that influenced the publisher de-
fendants’ collusion and Apple’s risky agency agreement switch. 
This Note argues that the combination of Amazon’s 90% market 
share, network externalities, and an innovative technology market creates 
an environment that highly incentivizes a dominant firm to exclude po-
tential rivals for as long as possible. Accordingly, when cases like United 
States v. Apple Inc. arise, there must be serious concern for not only price 
increases for consumers, but also diminished innovation in the market, 
which further harms consumers. I attempt to show that the market struc-
ture for e-books failed in some respects, which created an incentive for 
Apple—being a sophisticated and very large firm—to take highly risky 
steps to enter the e-book market. While Apple’s decision to coordinate 
with the publishers could have been out of greed, the market might have 
also failed by allowing substantial barriers to entry23 created by Ama-
zon’s pricing strategy. Although antitrust law attempts to keep firms 
from harming consumers with entry barriers for rivals, substantial barri-
                                                 
 19. The competitiveness could result from the market maturing or the publisher agency agree-
ments opening up the market to entry because of Amazon’s aggressive pricing strategy coupled with 
an oligopolistic publisher market that possibly created barriers to entry. 
 20. Although the definition of monopoly power has been phrased differently, the United States 
Supreme Court has defined it as “the power to control prices or exclude competition.” United States 
v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 571 (1966). In economic terms, it is the power to profitably raise 
price above the competitive level for a long period of time. 
 21. This is assuming that the pricing strategy was purely promotional as opposed to predatory 
pricing. See infra Part IV. 
 22. Although e-book prices have risen, e-reader prices have fallen substantially; thus, it is 
unclear whether consumers are harmed overall on balance. 
 23. “A barrier to entry is any factor that makes entry into a market unprofitable . . . .” PHILLIP 
E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, 3A ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 729a (3d ed. 2006). 
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ers for Apple to enter the e-book market would necessarily be substantial 
for smaller potential e-book retailers as well. Thereby, Amazon’s domi-
nant position in the market could still harm consumers. While the district 
court found that the higher prices resulting from Apple and the publish-
ers’ agreements harmed consumers, the de facto protection of Amazon’s 
dominant position could also harm consumers through reduced innova-
tion in the marketplace. Accordingly, when the government challenges 
practices in markets with a dominant buyer in the future, it should give 
extra care to ensure that the dominant firm is not de facto protected in a 
way that harms innovation in the marketplace. United States v. Apple Inc. 
exemplifies a modern trend of enforcement agencies pursuing claims 
based on collusive conduct as opposed to unilateral exclusionary con-
duct, which might not give sufficient weight to innovation concerns. 
To be clear, I am not arguing against the district court’s ruling that 
Apple violated Section 1 of the Sherman Act when it coordinated a 
switch from wholesale to agency contracts with publishers. My primary 
inquiry is into the potential effects on innovation when enforcement oc-
curs against rivals of a dominant firm in an innovative technology mar-
ket. Amazon’s main rival, Apple, went to great lengths and took major 
risks to enter the e-book market. Why did Apple simply choose not to 
compete on the merits of its product and brand equity (the iPad and 
iBookstore) as it does with its other products? Why did Apple decide not 
to continue to rely on its earlier success of situating its products differ-
ently in the market than other electronics and working hard to be differ-
ent and cutting-edge with its e-book delivery?24 I argue that the market 
failed in some respects. I explore the theory that entry could not occur 
without an increase in price and, further, without entry, harm to innova-
tion would result over time.25 
                                                 
 24. Because firms are profit-maximizing, one possible argument is that Apple did not rely on 
its competitive advantage because it saw an opportunity to be greedy and change the supply of e-
books; thus, it would receive a 30% commission on sales as opposed to the retail margin it would 
have received in the wholesale model. See United States v. Apple Inc., 952 F. Supp. 2d 638, 659 
(S.D.N.Y. 2013). However, a profit-maximizing firm would also take into account the potential 
liabilities resulting from regulatory enforcement and potential litigation costs. Accordingly, the 
decision to coordinate the agency model switch with the publishers involves a cost–benefit analysis 
that takes into account the potential legal costs. The fact that Apple disregarded the risk could imply 
that Apple believed any regulatory challenge could be mitigated because of Amazon’s pricing be-
havior with the publishers. 
 25. In Apple’s appellate brief for its pending appeal in the Second Circuit, Apple suggests that 
it did not need higher prices to enter the market because its 30% commission could make it profita-
ble at any price point. See Appellant Apple Inc.'s Opening Brief at 22, United States v. Apple Inc., 
No. 13-3741 (2d Cir. Feb. 25, 2014), ECF No. 157, 2014 WL 889710, at *22. Judge Cote stated that 
the record is “equivocal on whether Apple desired higher e-book prices . . . .” Id. Although I argue 
that the market required higher prices for entry to occur, Apple must argue it did not need higher 
prices to support its position on appeal; otherwise, it would place itself in a corner by attempting to 
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This Note is structured as follows: Part II discusses antitrust policy 
and innovation as a metric for consumer welfare. Part III discusses the 
facts of the Apple price-fixing case with a particular focus on the market 
conditions during the window where Amazon possessed 90% of the e-
book market. Part IV considers whether the market needed new entry. In 
other words, whether Amazon’s buyer power or the market structure 
gave rise to potential consumer harm. Market entry would thus be desir-
able to promote competition and innovation. This includes an analysis of 
Amazon’s pricing strategy before Apple entered the market and whether 
anticompetitive effects were present. Finally, Part V suggests that inno-
vation concerns in the e-books case were left on the backburner, and 
proposes how antitrust enforcement should keep innovation concerns as 
a primary goal to best fulfill the goals of protecting consumer welfare. 
Part VI concludes. 
II. BACKGROUND ON ANTITRUST LAW AND BUY-SIDE POWER 
Antitrust law attempts to solve an incentive problem of the free 
market. Economic analysis provides insight into how firms will act in the 
free market and, at the same time, reveals the potential harm that can re-
sult to the economy and consumers if marketplace regulation did not ex-
ist. In 1890, Congress passed the Sherman Antitrust Act to advance con-
sumer welfare by outlawing business arrangements that harm consum-
ers.26 Section 2 of the Sherman Act reads: “Every person who shall mo-
nopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any 
other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce 
among the several States . . . shall be deemed guilty of a felony.”27 To 
understand how Section 2 attempts to create the right incentives for a 
healthy economy and protection for consumers, I will briefly discuss the 
economic theory behind the Sherman Act. 
At the core of economics is the assumption that firms are profit 
maximizing.28 This assumption is the foundational incentive that drives 
firm behavior; hence, different market conditions will dictate different 
behavior for firms to satisfy that core drive. For example, in the textbook 
perfect competition model,29 a profit-maximizing firm will sell products 
                                                                                                             
justify raising e-book prices. But its statement does not speak to the potential for market-specific 
conditions requiring higher prices for entry to occur. 
 26. ROBERT BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 19–20 (1978). 
 27. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2004). 
 28. BORK, supra note 26, at 116, 120 (noting that firms do not always maximize profit, but 
firms behave as if they are striving to maximize profit). 
 29. Perfect competition is described as a market with many participants, each of whom is too 
small to affect the market price, an upward sloping marginal cost curve (production costs increase as 
quantity sold increases), and easy market entry and exit. 
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at the intersection of marginal cost30 and marginal revenue31 to be at an 
efficient equilibrium.32 Conversely, when a monopoly exists, the monop-
olist has an incentive to restrict its output to maximize profit. In effect, 
the monopolist can produce less than the competitive level of production 
and charge higher than the competitive price. A comparison of these two 
models illustrates that monopoly power can harm consumers by subject-
ing them to higher prices than they would face otherwise. Hence, in the 
most basic sense, antitrust exists to prohibit a firm’s behavior that re-
stricts output, thereby harming consumers with higher prices.33 
In determining whether monopoly conduct exists, courts look for 
market power34 and anticompetitive conduct.35 The ability for a monopo-
list to charge supracompetitive prices36 generally harms consumers and 
exhibits what antitrust law attempts to prevent. Supracompetitive prices 
harm consumers and reduce economic efficiency.37 In some instances, 
supracompetitive prices may be justified because of innovation in a mar-
ketplace.38 For example, Amazon first introduced the Kindle and, for a 
period, maintained a monopoly until a rival entered to constrain Ama-
zon.39 Justified monopoly power can induce new entrants into the market 
to capture some of the profits made by the monopolist.40 As more new 
entrants arrive, the supracompetitive prices will naturally fall until they 
reach the competitive level because new entrants will compete by charg-
ing consumers lower prices. Therefore, an additional requirement for 
determining monopoly power is whether the monopolist’s conduct cre-
ates barriers to entry. The combination of monopoly power and barriers 
to entry creates a market environment where the monopolist can sustain 
its output restrictions, limit new competition, and ultimately harm con-
                                                 
 30. Marginal cost is the incremental cost of each additional unit produced. 
 31. Marginal revenue is the incremental revenue for each additional unit sold. 
 32. See MARK A. LEMLEY & CHRISTOPHER LESLIE, GILBERT LAW SUMMARIES: ANTITRUST §§ 
609, 612, 615 (10th ed. 2004). 
 33. BORK, supra note 26, at 122. 
 34. Market power is the power to profitably raise price above the competitive level in the rele-
vant product and geographic market. See WILLIAM HOLMES & MELISSA MANGIARACINA, 
ANTITRUST LAW HANDBOOK § 3:4 (2013). 
 35. There are several well-established forms of anticompetitive conduct. See, e.g., Aspen Ski-
ing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1985) (refusals to deal with a rival); Brooke 
Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209 (1993) (predatory pricing); United 
States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 45 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (exclusive dealing and tying). 
 36. Supracompetitive prices are prices set above the competitive level. 
 37. See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, ¶ 403b. 
 38. See id. ¶ 407a. 
 39. United States v. Apple Inc., 952 F. Supp. 2d 638, 649 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (“[T]hrough 2009, 
Amazon dominated the e-book retail market, selling nearly 90% of all e-books.”). 
 40. See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, ¶ 407c. 
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sumers.41 Of course, barriers to entry naturally exist in the marketplace;42 
thus, the proper inquiry is whether artificial barriers exist that limit en-
try.43 Examples of conduct that create artificial barriers to entry include 
expanding capacity in advance of demand44 and predatory pricing.45 
Until now, this Part has discussed antitrust law in the traditional 
“sell-side” case, meaning that the law aims to protect consumers pur-
chasing from a monopolist. Conversely, antitrust law is also concerned 
with “buy-side” cases. A buy-side case protects upstream suppliers from 
a dominant buyer. Although the principle concern for antitrust is to pre-
vent a monopolist from transferring wealth from consumers to itself,46 
the legislative history of the Sherman Act supports the same concern for 
dominant buyers transferring wealth from suppliers to themselves. 47 
Moreover, the harm to supplier welfare has the potential to harm con-
sumer welfare by limiting options available to consumers.48 
Anticompetitive conduct harms consumers with “lower market out-
put, higher prices, reduced innovation, or some other indicator of dimin-
ished competitiveness.”49 Higher prices charged to consumers provide 
tangible and empirical characteristics that are calculable through market 
research. But consumer harm resulting from a reduction of innovation is 
more abstract. A monopolist can harm market innovation because (1) it 
has a sense of security from potential rivals, which lowers the monopo-
list’s incentive to innovate, and (2) a monopolist may have less to gain 
from innovative investments than a competitive firm because it already 
has a dominant position in the market.50 To counteract these negative 
                                                 
 41. See id. ¶ 403. 
 42. For example, a firm’s superior efficiency or a large capital investment requirement might 
limit the ability for new entrants, but neither are the type of barriers antitrust is concerned with be-
cause both benefit consumers by ensuring efficient firms compete in the market. If a firm can pro-
duce a product so efficiently that entrants are unable to compete, consumers still benefit from the 
efficiencies and antitrust will not step in. 
 43. BORK, supra note 26, at 311. 
 44. See United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 431 (2d Cir. 1945). 
 45. See, e.g., Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 223–24, 
(1993) (artificial barriers to entry can exist when a firm prices below an appropriate measure of cost, 
and the defendant has a reasonable prospect of recouping the profits sacrificed by pricing below 
cost). 
 46. By a firm restricting its output below the competitive level and charging higher prices than 
it would at the competitive level, a monopolist is receiving revenue that a consumer would not nor-
mally give the firm if it was a competitive market. 
 47. John B. Kirkwood & Robert H. Lande, The Fundamental Goal of Antitrust: Protecting 
Consumers, Not Increasing Efficiency, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 191, 234–35 (2008). 
 48. See infra Part IV (monopsony and countervailing power). 
 49. PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, 3 ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 651e (3d ed. 2006). 
 50. AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, ¶ 407c4. Although at the same time, monopoly 
power arguably has the potential to provide an incentive to innovate because the monopolist has 
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externalities, competition spurs innovation by providing consumers with 
better, less expensive products because the innovating firm is forced to 
improve its processes or product in order to compete.51 Moreover, poten-
tial rivals indirectly benefit because they build off the innovating firm 
and improve upon the recent innovation to compete, which provides con-
sumers with even greater benefits.52 The Department of Justice’s (DOJ) 
protection of Amazon’s dominance represents a potentially dangerous 
enforcement policy that places price concerns above market innovation. 
Without proper concern for innovation, DOJ’s enforcement policy might 
not guard consumer welfare in the long run. 
This Note will analyze the potential antitrust issues in light of Am-
azon’s dominant position in the e-book market. Accordingly, the analysis 
will entail a buy-side inquiry where the upstream suppliers are consid-
ered the “protected class,” by which the conduct of the dominant buyer 
(Amazon) can adversely affect the suppliers in a way that harms con-
sumers. Amazon’s dominant position not only has the potential to harm 
suppliers, but it could affect potential rivals in the e-book retailing mar-
ket. Consumer harm will be analyzed through inhibited innovation in 
light of the e-book market structure and antitrust enforcement against 
Apple. 
III. BACKGROUND ON UNITED STATES V. APPLE INC. 
From the publishers’ perspective, they needed to work with Ama-
zon to widely distribute their digital titles because no other e-retailer 
could reach Amazon’s customer base. As a result, if Amazon wanted to 
sell e-books for $9.99, the publishers had little negotiating power to ar-
gue otherwise. Although the publishers initially agreed to the $9.99 price 
to enter the market and maintain competitiveness with the other publish-
ers, they were concerned that, in the long term, consumers would grow 
accustomed to e-books priced at $9.99 and that the $9.99 price would 
erode prices for all books.53 The publishers felt that Amazon undervalued 
                                                                                                             
additional funds and a desire to invest in securing its position in the market, which can provide the 
monopolist with a perceived larger reward. See id. ¶ 407c2. 
 51. Jonathan B. Baker, Beyond Schumpeter vs. Arrow: How Antitrust Fosters Innovation, 74 
ANTITRUST L.J. 575, 587 (2007). 
 52. Id. at 587–88. 
 53. United States v. Apple Inc., 952 F. Supp. 2d 638, 649 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (“Prior to 2009, 
many publishers set a wholesale price for e-books at a 20% discount from the equivalent physical 
book wholesale price to reflect the many cost savings associated with the distribution and sale of e-
books.”). With Amazon’s discount pricing below the wholesale prices, the disparity between physi-
cal book prices and e-books was even greater than the 20% associated with cost reduction. See id. 
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the books and failed to distinguish the quality between books if they 
were all at the same price.54 
In response to this price concern, the publishers sought to use their 
power to increase the price to what they perceived as the competitive 
level. In an attempt to induce higher retail prices, the publishers set the 
wholesale price several dollars above the $9.99 price; yet, Amazon main-
tained its pricing policy for bestsellers.55 The publishers felt that raising 
prices a few dollars would solve the undervaluing problem.56 Additional-
ly, publishers discussed withholding new bestseller e-books from Ama-
zon to gain revenues from hardcovers before the e-books were available 
at the “artificially low $9.99 price point.”57 However, this was a risky—
and ultimately unrealistic—strategy because publishers feared that Ama-
zon would use its large buyer power to retaliate against them.58 
In late 2009, Apple prepared to launch the iPad tablet.59 Because e-
book wholesale prices typically ranged from $13 to $15,60 new retail en-
trants were concerned about their ability to compete with Amazon’s pric-
ing strategy. The combination of the publishers’ concern over the low 
price point and Apple’s concern over low (or negative) margins for e-
books and its ability to compete with Amazon led the parties to negotiate 
mutually beneficial supply terms.61 These negotiations led to a mutual 
desire for an agency model supplier agreement.62 An agency model al-
lowed the publishers to control the retail price of e-books and Apple 
would receive a percentage of each e-book sold. However, for this 
scheme to be successful, and to force Amazon to switch to the new pric-
ing model, all of the publishers had to agree to the switch from wholesale 
to agency.63 
Accordingly, all of the publisher defendants agreed to use agency 
contracts with Apple, and then each successfully pressured Amazon to 
change from wholesale to agency contracts.64 Although Amazon is a 
dominant firm with leverage over its suppliers, the publishers were able 
to pressure Amazon to switch supplier contracts by threatening to with-
hold new releases from Amazon for seven months after their release.65 
                                                 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. at 650. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. at 652. 
 58. See id. at 650. 
 59. Id. at 654. 
 60. Id. at 656. 
 61. Id. at 656–57. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. at 679. 
 65. Id. at 687. 
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As a result of increased prices from the coordinated actions of the pub-
lishers and Apple, the court convicted Apple of per se price fixing in vio-
lation of Section 166 of the Sherman Act.67 
IV. THE E-BOOKS MARKET AND AMAZON’S BUYER POWER 
A. Description of the E-books Market 
Justified monopoly power68 does not, by itself, harm consumers; in 
fact, a firm with justified monopoly power can benefit consumers by at-
tracting new participants into the market to capture the monopolist’s 
profit share, which drives prices down to the competitive level in the 
long run.69 Nevertheless, because market innovators initially hold high 
market share, it is important to determine whether barriers to entry that 
harm consumer welfare exist. 70  Aggressive competitive conduct by a 
monopolist benefits consumers because it provides valuable innovative 
products, whereas aggressive exclusionary conduct harms consumers by 
inhibiting benefits from competition; the problem, however, is that both 
“[c]ompetitive and exclusionary conduct look alike.”71 On the one hand, 
Amazon innovated the e-book market by developing a successful e-
reader in conjunction with a distribution system that allowed for low-
cost, expansive digital retailing. Amazon’s initial success directly result-
ed from pleasing consumers and providing a strong product. On the other 
hand, it seems strange that a sophisticated party like Apple would take 
such great risks to enter the market unless a market barrier existed.72 
                                                 
 66. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2004) (“Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or 
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce . . . is declared to be illegal.” In essence, the agree-
ments between Apple and the publishers that switched e-book supply from wholesale to agency 
contracts constituted a contract in restraint of trade). 
 67. Apple Inc., 952 F. Supp. 2d at 709. Apple filed a timely appeal with the Second Circuit 
Court of Appeals on February 25, 2014. See generally Appellant Apple Inc.'s Opening Brief , United 
States v. Apple Inc., No. 13-3741 (2d Cir. Feb. 25, 2014), ECF No. 157, 2014 WL 889710. 
 68. Innovation can justify monopoly power because new innovative products both benefit 
consumers and naturally induce entry into the market. Assuming the innovating firm does not create 
artificial entry barriers, this could exemplify justified monopoly power. 
 69. See Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 407 
(2004) (“The opportunity to charge monopoly prices—at least for a short period—is what attracts 
‘business acumen’ in the first place; it induces risk taking that produces innovation and economic 
growth. To safeguard the incentive to innovate, the possession of monopoly power will not be found 
unlawful unless it is accompanied by an element of anticompetitive conduct.”). 
 70. Consumer welfare can be defined simply as the happiness of consumers. For example, 
consumer welfare is harmed when prices are increased, choices are limited, or there is asymmetrical 
information without any benefits that might outweigh the harms caused. 
 71. Frank H. Easterbrook, On Identifying Exclusionary Conduct, 61 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 972, 
972 (1986). 
 72. An economist would argue that a profit-maximizing firm would act rationally when making 
business decisions; thus, the firm will weigh opportunity costs and potential returns when deciding 
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Whether or not that barrier was artificial or a result of a competitive 
marketplace can dictate whether any harm to consumers actually oc-
curred. 
An understanding of the players in the market and their unique 
characteristics helps to analyze whether barriers existed in the new mar-
ket. To begin, Amazon—a dominant firm with large buying power and a 
low-cost business model—will affect how its suppliers act in the market. 
Amazon is an attractive retailer for publishers because of its ability to 
efficiently reach a large consumer base. Second, six large publishers ex-
ist in the book industry.73 Each publisher holds an effective monopoly on 
its titles; thus, they compete with each other through the quality of au-
thors signed, marketing, price, etc. With the context of this particular 
market in mind, the following analysis will discuss the potential for ex-
clusionary conduct that could harm consumers. 
1. Monopsony Power 
The first structural analysis of buyer power considers whether Am-
azon had monopsony power during the e-book market’s inception. A 
firm has monopsony power when “a single buyer faces a large number of 
suppliers, each too small to affect the market price and each operating on 
an upward-sloping marginal cost curve.”74 In effect, the numerous sup-
pliers are in a competitive supplier market and, as the quantity sold in-
creases, the marginal cost of each additional unit sold increases due to 
increasing costs of production.75 Thus, prices for the buyer increase as 
quantity sold increases. As a result, to keep costs low, a dominant buyer 
will buy fewer units than it would if it was in a competitive buyer mar-
ket.76 Although this reduces supplier welfare because a competitive buy-
er’s market would result in greater quantity purchased, the real question 
for antitrust law is whether this structure can harm consumer welfare. In 
                                                                                                             
to enter into a market and how to go about doing that. However, an argument exists that Apple, like 
Microsoft in the 1990s, was acting like a “lone wolf” in terms of its legal considerations and its 
interactions with the Government and the marketplace. Accordingly, in its effort to maximize profits, 
Apple might be have been downplaying other risks, like treble damages from antitrust liability. See 
Steve Friess, Apple’s Lone Wolf Strategy Backfires, POLITICO (July 31, 2013), http://www.politico 
.com/story/2013/07/apple-finds-dc-is-tough-without-friends-94948.html?hp=l5. 
 73. The large publishers include: Hachette Book Group, Inc.; HarperCollins Publishers LLC; 
Holtzbrinck Publishers LLC d/b/a Macmillan, Penguin Group (USA), Inc.; Simon & Schuster, Inc.; 
and Random House, Inc. Random House was not a party to the suit because they did not initially join 
Apple’s agency agreements until after the other five publishers executed the agreements. United 
States v. Apple Inc., 952 F. Supp. 2d 638, 648 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
 74. John B. Kirkwood, Powerful Buyers and Merger Enforcement, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1485, 1495 
(2012). 
 75. Id. 
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theory, by purchasing fewer units than the competitive level, the 
monopsonist will have a lower output than the competitive level, which 
could result in higher prices for consumers.77 
Several reasons exist for why this model does not apply to Ama-
zon’s control of the e-book market. First, the publishers face a relatively 
flat marginal cost curve. The publishers’ cost for each additional e-book 
sold to Amazon is little to none.78 A flat marginal cost curve results in no 
incentive for Amazon to purchase less than the competitive amount. In 
other words, Amazon could buy as many e-books as it wanted without 
the fear of facing increased costs associated with publishers having to 
print, ship, or warehouse more books. 
Second, there are a limited number of publishers rather than a large 
number that the monopsony model requires. Each of the publishers holds 
an effective monopoly over its own titles, so each has the power to affect 
market price for their individual titles. Although Amazon held a 90% 
share of the e-book market, the publishers could exert power over Ama-
zon, such as when they attempted to withhold bestsellers and successful-
ly got Amazon to switch to agency agreements.79 
As a result, it is unlikely that Amazon held monopsony power over 
the publishers in the e-book market. The market conditions and unique 
nature of the publishing business model depict a market that is unlike 
those where monopsony power might be exhibited.80  
The next step is to consider whether Amazon demonstrated an al-
ternate form of buyer power: countervailing power. 
2. Countervailing Power 
The second form of buyer power is countervailing power.81 This 
power arises when there are relatively few suppliers with market power 
and a constant or downward sloping marginal cost curve.82 As a result, 
the powerful buyer may exert countervailing power with either pro-
competitive or potentially anticompetitive consequences.83 Because the 
small number of publishers can result in oligopolistic behavior,84 coun-
                                                 
 77. Id. at 1498. 
 78. Digital books provide publishers numerous cost savings that result in flattening a supply 
curve: printing, storage, packaging, shipping, or return of e-books all provide cost savings in the e-
book industry. See Apple Inc., 952 F. Supp. 2d at 649. 
 79. See id. at 687. 
 80. Kirkwood, supra note 74, at 1496–97 (stating that cases of monopsony power have been 
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 81. Id. at 1500. 
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 83. Id. at 1500–01. 
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tervailing power can help consumers by bringing the previously 
supracompetitive prices down to the competitive level.85 Hence, a domi-
nant firm can use its buyer power to force prices to a level where an oli-
gopoly would not get to on its own by inducing competition, which in-
creases consumer welfare through lower prices.86 
There are several situations, however, where countervailing power 
might result in harm to consumer welfare. First, a large buyer may be 
able to get “substantial, discriminatory discounts” from suppliers in order 
to push smaller buyers out of the market with its competitive ad-
vantage.87 The key question is whether the substantial discounts lever-
aged over the suppliers are used to compete aggressively, which would 
benefit consumers, or as a means to bar competition in the marketplace, 
which harms consumers. For example, this type of conduct exemplifies 
pushing out retail rivals or preventing retail rivals from entering the mar-
ket so the dominant firm can raise prices. Second, by inducing competi-
tion among a small number of suppliers, the dominant buyer might create 
adverse effects on small buyers because they are unable to utilize the 
leverage over the suppliers to get prices lower; hence, the result might 
create less options for consumers until the smaller buyers reach efficien-
cies to compete with the dominant firm.88 In effect, even if the dominant 
firm did not drive out or prevent other retailers from competing, it could 
reduce consumer choice by inhibiting buyers’ growth or entry into the 
market. 
In this case, the countervailing model aligns well with the e-book 
market prior to Apple’s entry. As stated earlier, e-book publishers face a 
relatively flat marginal cost curve due to the digital nature of e-books 
creating little or no additional cost for each e-book sold. The pro-
competitive effects of countervailing power probably do not apply here 
because of the lack of supracompetitive pricing at the publisher level. 
The facts show that the publishers were unhappy with Amazon’s pricing 
strategy, yet they were unable to leverage Amazon to use the prices they 
felt were competitive. The wholesale model gave Amazon the power to 
set retail prices. Further, the extent to which oligopolistic behavior exist-
ed was in terms of each publisher fearing attempts to raise prices on its 
                                                                                                             
concept incorporates game theory such that if supplier A is concerned about supplier B dropping 
prices, A could drop prices first, which risks B dropping prices even lower. B necessarily would face 
the same situation; thus, both A and B will keep prices higher than the competitive level to maintain 
their margins, and, as a result, harm consumers with higher prices just as if a monopoly existed. See 
AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, ¶ 404a. 
 85. Kirkwood, supra note 74, at 1505. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. at 1506. 
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own. The evidence shows that the wholesale prices the publishers 
charged Amazon ranged from $13.00 to $17.50;89 yet, Amazon persisted 
to sell bestsellers at $9.99. If Amazon has countervailing power, then the 
retail prices prove that Amazon—as a dominant firm—has the potential 
to act anti-competitively because it is not fully constrained by a perfectly 
competitive retail market in e-books. Whether Amazon utilized its coun-
tervailing power to maintain its monopoly in e-books or whether it mere-
ly competed aggressively is a difficult question to answer. In order to 
make this determination, further analysis of Amazon’s conduct is need-
ed. 
Although Amazon’s countervailing power has the potential to be 
anticompetitive, it is not strong enough to justify Apple’s collusion with 
the publishers.90 First, if Amazon used its power against the publishers, 
the publishers would receive lower revenues, and the variety and quality 
of books released by the publishers would presumably decrease due to 
less available resources.91 The evidence, however, does not support this 
inference.92 Second, countervailing power would inhibit a supplier from 
pressuring the buyer; nevertheless, the publishers considered challenging 
Amazon on several occasions by withholding e-book bestsellers in order 
to promote hardcover sales.93 Although withholding titles is risky for 
each individual publisher, the effective monopoly on individual titles 
allows the publishers to potentially constrain Amazon’s countervailing 
power.94 As a result, consumer choices for books were not limited by 
Amazon’s buyer power.95 Professor Kirkwood argues that the sharp rise 
in prices resulting from the publishers’ collusion does not benefit con-
sumers by balancing out the potential harms from buyer power.96 
Even though Amazon’s buyer power might not justify the publish-
ers’ collusion to switch supply arrangements, consumer choice could be 
limited by the e-reader options if artificial barriers to entry existed at the 
                                                 
 89. United States v. Apple Inc., 952 F. Supp. 2d 638, 656 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
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time. The emergence of the e-book market combined with the network 
externalities97 of e-reader users creates a large incentive to exclude com-
petition at the market’s inception. The longer rivals are barred from mar-
ket entry, the more time the innovator has to capture e-reader users who 
will be locked into to purchasing e-books for that specific e-reader in the 
future. Accordingly, excluding potential rivals from the e-book market 
via Amazon’s countervailing power could harm consumers by limiting 
available options in the short term. If Amazon’s behavior makes the e-
book market one such that rivals cannot compete on the merits—
incentivizing Apple to coordinate supply agreements with the publish-
ers—then it is questionable whether the government should enforce anti-
trust law that effectively protects this dominant behavior and power.98 
Thus, the DOJ’s enforcement against Apple and the publishers without a 
strong inquiry99 into Amazon’s behavior could be seen as not fulfilling 
the goal of protecting consumer welfare. Of course, Amazon could be 
utilizing efficiencies to outperform potential rivals, which benefits con-
sumers by providing a superior product.100 
If countervailing power exists, one way to determine whether or not 
it should be condemned is to consider the function of the restraint in the 
particular market. 101  It is important to consider the characteristics of 
competitive forces in the market and whether or not the market can re-
main competitive notwithstanding the countervailing restraint. 102  This 
inquiry requires consideration of whether market entry was desirable at 
the time Amazon held 90% of the e-book market. Focusing on the par-
                                                 
 97. A network externality means that “each additional user of a given e-books system confers 
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ticular market emphasizes the importance for antitrust law to remain 
flexible in its application to ensure the ultimate goal of protecting con-
sumer welfare. 
B. Predatory Pricing or Loss Leading? 
An existing market failure that prevents new entrants in the e-book 
market could explain why Apple decided to conspire with the defendant 
publishers. An argument put forward in Apple’s defense was that Ap-
ple’s cartel opened up the market and allowed participants to compete on 
a level playing field.103 Indeed, in the two years following the switch to 
agency agreements, Amazon’s market share fell from 90% to 60%.104 
Moreover, because of the network externalities105 that exist between e-
readers and e-books, Amazon had a large incentive to entrench itself as 
the dominant e-book retailer early on. 106  These considerations could 
show either that Amazon’s pricing strategy before the agency agreements 
was an artificial barrier to entry, or that the e-book market naturally ma-
tured to attract entrants because of Amazon’s clear success. 
1. Predatory Pricing 
Apple and the publishers voiced concern that Amazon created bar-
riers to entry via predatory pricing of its e-books.107 Predatory pricing is 
an anticompetitive strategy in which a firm drives out or excludes rivals 
by selling at below-cost prices108 to prevent rivals from competing on the 
product’s merits.109 In addition to setting below-cost prices, the second 
requirement for predatory pricing is a dangerous prospect of recouping 
the profits sacrificed from below-cost pricing.110  In theory, predatory 
pricing harms consumers because artificially low prices drive out com-
petitors and allow the predatory firm to charge high prices after entry is 
discouraged.111 In reality, however, antitrust enforcement and courts pro-
                                                 
 103. Apple Inc., 889 F. Supp. 2d at 639–40. 
 104. Id. at 640. 
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ceed cautiously with predatory pricing claims because lower prices clear-
ly benefit consumers; thus, the second prong of the analysis is critical to 
determine whether a particular conduct is anticompetitive.112 
In this case, the anticompetitive conduct of predatory pricing could 
potentially create a barrier to entry for rival e-book retailers. A barrier to 
entry makes entry unprofitable, which discourages entry by making the 
cost of doing business higher for new firms than it is for established 
firms.113 In this case, Amazon’s pricing policy made it prohibitively more 
costly for a rival to do business because it would be forced to take losses 
on e-books to compete. 
Because Amazon’s Kindle and e-books are complementary prod-
ucts, the analysis of below-cost pricing is difficult. To begin, Amazon’s 
90% market share highly suggests monopoly power, yet it depends on 
the relevant market definition and entry barriers. Amazon sold many e-
books at a price below wholesale cost. Indeed, Amazon maintained a 
$9.99 price point for books it paid $13 to $17 wholesale.114 Therefore, 
the below-cost price point could be satisfied for the purposes of predato-
ry pricing if the relevant market definition is e-books. Notably, however, 
Amazon’s below-cost pricing was not pervasive across all of the books it 
offered for sale. Nevertheless, new releases and bestsellers make up the 
majority of sales.115 
Currently, the second element to a predatory pricing claim requires 
a plaintiff to show a dangerous prospect of the defendant recouping the 
profits sacrificed by pricing below cost.116 Whether or not the profits sac-
rificed by selling e-books below the wholesale price were worth it for 
Amazon requires a bit of speculation; nonetheless, plausible theories of 
recoupment exist. The first, and most obvious, is that the profits sacri-
ficed by selling e-books below wholesale prices could be recouped 
through the profits received from Kindle sales.117 Because of the com-
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plementary nature of Kindles and e-books—combined with Amazon’s 
market power in the e-reader market—a reduction in the price for e-
books will increase demand for Kindles.118 By charging below-cost pric-
es for e-books, Amazon can increase its profits from Kindles and, thus, 
exclude potential rivals from entering the market because rivals cannot 
compete without taking substantial losses on e-books.119 This exclusion 
is especially true for smaller firms attempting to compete in retailing e-
books. But, it is possible to argue that Apple—a large firm with many 
resources—could reach efficiencies and use a pricing policy similar to 
Amazon’s in order to compete effectively. Yet antitrust law attempts to 
prevent firms from using predatory conduct to create an anticompetitive 
marketplace. By using a predatory pricing strategy, firms prevent the 
free-market from determining prices by using their dominant position to 
exclude and harm competition. Even more, the network externalities of 
the e-book market create a huge incentive for Amazon to preserve its 
market power.120 
Moreover, further support for Amazon’s potentially predatory con-
duct involves Amazon’s pricing strategy as a company rather than solely 
in the e-book market. In the third quarter of 2013, Amazon made $17.09 
billion in net sales; however, it posted a net loss of 9¢ per share.121 After 
releasing these financials, Amazon’s publicly traded shares rose 1.5 per-
cent.122 This paradox seems to support Amazon’s greater company strat-
egy of not focusing on short-run profits, but rather capturing market 
share by taking net losses in the short run. While this evidence, alone, 
does not fully support a claim based on predatory conduct, it provides an 
example of the strong incentives driving Amazon’s pricing strategy. If 
share value increases substantially despite net profit loss, then the share-
holders value Amazon’s ability to capture market share with the potential 
for long-run gains greater than short-run losses. Furthermore, because 
Amazon utilizes advanced pricing strategies based on complex algo-
rithms, losses incurred from e-books could easily be recouped elsewhere 
in their diverse sales. Although this might be an unprofitable strategy in 
the short term and, thus, is not going to occur often because of the as-
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sumption that firms maximize profits, evidence shows that Amazon is 
not afraid to take losses to maintain or gain market power.123 However, a 
fine line exists between pricing strategies used to capture market share 
and those used to keep rivals out. 
The point of the foregoing analysis is not to argue that a predatory 
pricing claim should be made against Amazon.124 In fact, a predatory 
pricing claim would be extremely difficult because of the high and com-
plex threshold of proving a dangerous probability of recouping the prof-
its sacrificed. Instead, the goal is to bring to light nuances in the evidence 
and the incentives driving the different parties, which show that the gov-
ernment’s de facto protection of Amazon might not fulfill the goal of 
protecting consumer welfare. 
2. Loss Leading 
The strongest argument in support of Amazon’s conduct is that they 
engaged in a pro-competitive loss leading strategy.125 Loss leading refers 
to the pricing strategy in which a firm discounts a product to promote 
and market a different product.126 In this case, Amazon’s sales of e-books 
below the wholesale price could be characterized as loss leading to pro-
mote purchases of the Kindle. This, in turn, supports the strong incen-
tives to capture users early because of the network externalities men-
tioned earlier. Notably, loss leading is a competitive strategy that compa-
nies use to compete aggressively with pro-competitive benefits to con-
sumers.127 
Professor Kirkwood concludes that Amazon most likely used loss 
leading as opposed to predatory pricing.128 In support of this position, he 
argues that (1) Judge Cote and numerous commentators characterized the 
behavior as loss leading; (2) Amazon never sold all of its books below 
cost, which it would do if it was truly committed to excluding rivals; (3) 
Amazon cut back its discounts since prices of e-readers have recently 
dropped, which evidences Amazon’s goal to attain profits from the Kin-
dle as opposed to monopoly power in the e-books market; and (4) rival e-
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book retailers have since entered the market, suggesting a lack of a dan-
gerous probability of monopolization.129 
While it is simple to characterize Amazon’s behavior as loss lead-
ing, more emphasis should be given to the fact that it was an innovator in 
a market with network externalities. Amazon did not need to sell all of its 
books below cost to successfully exclude rivals from entry into this new 
market. Because of the network externalities, Amazon merely needed to 
attract as many users from the outset to ensure continued e-book pur-
chases through its device. Thus, Amazon’s below-cost pricing strategy 
focused on new releases and bestsellers,130 which would necessarily at-
tract a majority of consumers to purchase a Kindle. As a result, the com-
bination of network externalities and Amazon’s position as a market in-
novator creates a situation ripe for exclusionary conduct at the outset, 
which greatly benefits the long-term profits of Amazon once users are in 
the network via a Kindle. Although substantial product discounts used to 
capture users at the market’s inception might benefit consumers in the 
short-run, if the discounts are done in such a way as to exclude rivals 
from the ability to enter into the market and compete, then long-run harm 
could occur via decreased innovation and choices, which might outweigh 
the pro-competitive effects. 
C. Structural Market Failure 
While it is arguable whether Amazon unilaterally created barriers to 
entry at the inception of the e-books market, the unique nature of the 
market provides support for a structural market failure theory. This theo-
ry purports that because of the unique nature of the e-book market, entry 
would not have occurred without an increase in price. Further, without 
entry occurring, innovation in the marketplace would be diminished over 
time. 
As Professor Kirkwood argues, the publishers’ collusion was likely 
not justified in light of the unique market conditions with a dominant 
buyer;131 yet, the government’s de facto protection of Amazon’s pricing 
behavior and market dominance to enforce a relatively simple per se 
price fixing case does not necessarily ensure a competitive marketplace 
that promotes innovation. The resulting protection of Amazon’s domi-
nance could impede innovation because if Apple found it challenging to 
enter the market, then it would follow that smaller retailers would cer-
tainly find it challenging as well. For example, only three e-book retail-
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ers effectively make up the market: Amazon, Apple, and Barnes & No-
ble.132 Barnes & Noble’s Nook continues to lose money because it is un-
able to compete with Amazon’s below-cost e-book prices.133 Although 
antitrust law does not exist to help rivals compete,134 it does exist to pro-
tect consumers from a firm’s conduct that limits consumer choices or 
inhibits innovation by excluding potential rivals. The stark impact on the 
Nook shows how the protection of a dominant firm in a concentrated 
market can harm competition in the marketplace. 
Alternatively, the small number of competitors in the market could 
evidence a version of a natural monopoly. A natural monopoly occurs 
when a relevant market does not support more than one firm.135 Competi-
tion is not possible because a rival’s entry would be irrational and actual-
ly harm consumers.136 A natural monopoly could theoretically arise due 
to three factors: (1) thin demand that only supports one firm in the mar-
ket; (2) changes in consumer preference or cost that drive out all but the 
most efficient or highly demanded firm; or (3) superior skill and effi-
ciencies that other firms cannot compete with.137 Here, Amazon’s 90% 
share and the difficulty for potential rivals to enter and compete effec-
tively could be a result of its superior skill and efficiencies resulting from 
its economies of scale. Because e-books are not Amazon’s sole source of 
revenue and it successfully reaches a large customer base, Amazon might 
hold a type of superior skill and efficiency. 
But when considering the situation of a new entrant into the e-book 
market after Amazon secured its footing as a dominant firm, the structure 
is not akin to normal natural monopolies.138 The publishers were already 
upset with Amazon’s pricing; thus, it is unlikely they want a new retailer 
to continue with a similar policy. However, a new retailer must compete 
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with Amazon. Assuming Amazon was not acting predatorily, unless the 
new retailer can match the same efficiencies as Amazon and take losses 
in e-book sales in order to secure a position in the market, competition to 
constrain Amazon would not exist unless the retailers also introduced an 
e-reader with which to compete. This result effectively forces any poten-
tial rival to adopt the same business model as Amazon, which could stifle 
innovation in e-book retailing. The stifling could occur by deterring po-
tential entrants because of the enormous costs of developing an e-reader, 
or, conversely, it could deter Amazon from innovating e-book retailing 
because it faces little realistic competition from rivals. While both exter-
nalities exist, the inhibiting of innovation by new market entrants is ar-
guably more important.139 
On the other hand, it could be argued that Barnes & Noble should 
simply innovate in order to compete with Amazon. While this may push 
Barnes & Noble to innovate in areas such as e-readers or digital content, 
Amazon’s dominance can impede the incentive to innovate in the e-book 
retailing market because, from Barnes & Noble’s perspective (or any 
potential rival in the e-book market), it is difficult to attain a return on 
the investment if the firm cannot compete on e-book prices.140 A rival 
retailer could gain returns from digital content and e-readers, but not 
from the books themselves. Higher e-book prices, however, would “in-
duce[] risk taking that produces innovation and economic growth”141 in 
the e-book retail market. 
The increase in e-book prices would provide the necessary incen-
tive for competitors to enter the market and constrain Amazon’s domi-
nant power. This new competition would properly incentivize innovation 
in e-book retailers, which benefits consumers in the long run. Instead, 
protecting Amazon’s dominant power potentially creates disincentives 
                                                 
 139. See Tim Wu, Taking Innovation Seriously: Antitrust Enforcement if Innovation Mattered 
Most, 78 ANTITRUST L.J. 313, 318 (2012) (explaining that “external innovation is more likely to be 
of a ‘disruptive’ nature—a giant leap forward,” and internal innovation (e.g., innovation by Amazon) 
depends on external constraints (e.g., rivals’ innovation)). 
 140. Competition with e-books would exist to the extent that potential rivals would compete 
based on how great of a loss they are willing to take in order to match Amazon’s prices. The profit 
maximization assumption would lead firms to simply match Amazon’s price; thus, e-book pricing 
competition is effectively inhibited by Amazon’s market dominance and the unique market condi-
tions. Amazon’s dominance effectively rids the e-book market of competition and forces potential 
competitors to compete on other merits, such as e-readers, digital content, etc. 
 141. Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 407 
(2004). Although the Trinko decision was made in light of maintaining a monopoly because of a lack 
of anticompetitive conduct, the principle of higher prices inducing firms to innovate holds strong. 
See also Content Pricing Consultant: Ebooks Should Be (Much) More Expensive, 
DIGITALBOOKWORLD (Apr. 2, 2014), http://www.digitalbookworld.com/2014/content-pricing-
consultant-ebooks-should-be-much-more-expensive/ (arguing that e-book prices should be higher to 
reflect the added convenience and consumer benefits when compared to print books). 
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for innovation in the e-book market. While the unique characteristics of 
the market might not justify collusion,142 the clear innovation concerns 
should speak to how the government utilizes its discretion when bringing 
claims against firms in markets characterized by a dominant firm, a small 
number of players, network externalities, and technology.143 
V. DID ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT PROMOTE INNOVATION IN THE E-
BOOK MARKET? 
Assuming that firms maximize profits and act rationally, the result-
ing collusion between Apple and the defendant publishers exemplifies 
the adverse results of Amazon’s dominant power. The unique nature of 
the market and Amazon’s pricing policy contributed, in part, to incentiv-
izing the “supreme evil of antitrust: collusion.”144 Thus, an issue raised in 
this case is whether the government should give more deference to inno-
vation concerns before it brings a claim that, if successful, protects a 
dominant buyer in an innovative market characterized with network ex-
ternalities. The dichotomy between the government’s pursuit of exclu-
sionary claims and collusion claims poses a much-discussed policy issue 
for antitrust law. As Professor Baker advocates, although greater weight 
seems to be given toward enforcing antitrust litigation against collusion, 
exclusionary conduct is a vital aspect at the core of sound antitrust poli-
cy.145 Even though collusion and exclusion arise from different business 
strategies, one should not be given more weight over the other in terms 
of enforcement.146 In other words, the DOJ should not enforce the Sher-
man Act against collusion at the cost of protecting another party’s exclu-
sionary behavior because both harm consumer welfare. 
Taking this idea a step further, if competition favors innovation and 
the purpose of antitrust law is to adequately promote increased innova-
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tion, then the government should give more weight to potential exclu-
sionary conduct from a dominant firm that inhibits innovation than short-
term price increases in the market. Price increases might harm consumers 
in the short run, but long-run harm to innovation in the market can out-
weigh the higher price concerns on balance. At the very least, claims 
should steer away from a per se analysis when issues of innovation are at 
play in a unique market such as this. 
Although measuring the effects on innovation is a much more 
vague and abstract goal when compared to a price increase from a per se 
price fixing cartel, protecting innovation is much more important.147 In 
this case, enforcement could harm innovation by penalizing and disad-
vantaging the one potential rival that could constrain Amazon’s power, 
which resulted in de facto protection of Amazon—a dominant firm. In-
hibiting the only real rival able to constrain Amazon’s dominant position 
in the market could harm innovation by decreasing Amazon’s incentive 
to innovate and improve e-book delivery to consumers because it faces 
less competition in the marketplace.148 
To support this theory, evaluation of the market and Apple’s behav-
ior shows the potential for consumer harm in the long run. The combina-
tion of Amazon’s market power, network externalities, and an innovative 
marketplace provide a unique incentive structure for innovation concerns 
in antitrust enforcement and litigation. While these factors create an en-
vironment ripe for exclusion at the market’s inception, the effects on in-
novation of enforcement are difficult to measure without more infor-
mation about the rate of innovation before and after enforcement. If anti-
trust enforcement against Apple promoted innovation, then the result of 
United States v. Apple Inc. should point to firms using innovative strate-
gies of e-book retailing post-enforcement.149 Today, however, price re-
mains the “weapon of choice” for capturing market share, with Amazon 
being the price leader.150 
United States v. Apple Inc. exemplifies the tension between the two 
types of anticompetitive conduct and antitrust policy. It makes complete 
sense for the DOJ to attack the cartel that Apple and the publishers creat-
ed because it overtly resulted in higher prices as a result of the supply 
contract switch. However, when a dominant market innovator—like Am-
azon—uses pricing policies that have the potential to bar entry in an in-
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novative technology market with network externalities, antitrust en-
forcement should take extra care to not protect the dominant firm. Pro-
tecting a dominant firm’s power has the potential to diminish incentives 
to innovate in the market, which harms consumers. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Antitrust enforcement that fulfills the goal of protecting consumer 
welfare within innovative industries entails some substantial challenges. 
Anticompetitive conduct that affects price clearly provides tangible evi-
dence, whereas harm to innovation is a much more abstract proposition. 
Nevertheless, when the government challenges practices in concentrated 
markets with a dominant buyer in the future, it should give greater defer-
ence to innovation to ensure that the dominant firm is not de facto pro-
tected in a way that harms consumers in the long-run. United States v. 
Apple Inc. exemplifies a modern trend of enforcement agencies pursuing 
claims based on collusive conduct as opposed to unilateral exclusionary 
conduct, which might cost consumers in terms of market innovation in 
the long run. While enforcement agencies pursue per se claims because 
of the high probability for a “win,” there must be greater concern for 
long-term harm to consumer welfare from inhibited innovation in the 
market post-enforcement. 
